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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to examine the degree to which the economic characteristics of 
the railway industry lead to barriers to entry, in the light of recent theoretical and 
empirical evidence and in response to policy developments in Britain. In particular, the 
US railroad industry was deregulated in 1980, the Canadian railroad industry was 
liberalised in 1987 (Gi-imm and Rogers, 1991), whilst there have been important 
organisational reforms in, amongst others, Britain, Sweden and Japan (see, for example, 
Nash, 1990, Truelove, 1991). In both Britain and Sweden, the intention is to allow 
competing operators into the market; in both Britain and Japan it is intended to privatize 
existing operators. Furthermore, in a policy statement issued in 1989, the EEC outlined 
details of a Community rail policy which includes proposals to separate infrastructure 
from operations and to allow access to the inhstructure by competing operators (Nash, 
1991). The latter issue is now the subject of an EC Directive. Legal rights of access to 
railway infrastructui-e in EC countries have been established for: 
O international groupings of railway undertakings - defined as two or more 
operations fi-om different countries wishing to run international services between 
the Member States where the undertakings are based 
O any railway undertaking wishing to run international combined transport goods 
services between any Member States. 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. In section 2, we discuss the economic 
characteristics of the railway industry and examine likely barriers to entry. In section 
3 we examine empirical evidence on economies of scale and the impacts of organisation 
on the rail industry. In section 4 we go on to examine the current proposals for 
organisational and 1-egulatory reform for British Rail in the light of this evidence. This 
leads us, in section 5, to draw some tentative conclusions as to the best way forward for 
the British railway industry. 
2. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RAILWAY INDUSTRIES 
Rail operators are traditionally responsible for providing their own infrastructure, 
principally track, signalling and terminals and as a result fixed costs form a large element 
of total costs. Studies suggest that between 50% and 80% of infrastructure costs are fixed 
in the short run (University of LeedsBRB, 19791, whilst the capacity and signalling 
systems remain unchanged. Moreover, this infrastructure has a long asset life and is 
geographically-specific, it can not be re-deployed elsewhere and has minimal scrap value. 
In other words, it represents a sunk cost. In addition, even in the longer run, when 
capacity and signalling can be adjusted, it is subject to major indivisibilities (as are the 
vehicles used) and economies of scale. Moving from single track to double track involves 
a less than double cost increase, but, due to the removal of vehicle conflicts, often 
quadruples capacity, although further increases in track capacity exhibit less marked 
economies (Nash, 1982). 
The other main feature of railways is that they are a multi-product industry involved not 
only in serving different origins and destinations at different times, but also in providing 
for different types of passengers and freight. Given fixed costs and indivisibilities, this 
means that there are a large number ofjoint costs which are difficult to allocate between 
products. It also gives rise to expectations of marked economies of scope, although the 
evidence here is more mixed. 

















